

Theoretical Perspectives
on
Sexual Difference

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Feminism and Sexual Difference in Historical Perspective

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The challenge of postmodern thought has engaged the attention of scholars in many fields, not least in feminist theory. As debate has proceeded, however, the voices of historians have been missing or heard only discreetly in the background. It is high time that historians of women and of feminism enter this debate. Practitioners of the historical craft, especially those who work on comparative history, have much to contribute to this endeavor.

At the core of the feminist project lies the claim of solidarity or common cause among women as a group across lines of religion, class, race, and other historically significant divisions. This claim has generally rested on a common set of female values and aspirations, rooted more often than not in motherhood and nurturance and also in an effort to reclaim for women the right to define what "women" are and should be.¹ It bears emphasis that this was from the beginning a call for solidarity, not a description of reality. In earlier centuries perhaps even more than today many factors divided both women and men. Like the assertion in our own Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal, the claim for female solidarity was a brave and utopian assertion. The French journalist "Jeanne-Victoire" put it this way in 1832, in an all-women's newspaper, *La Femme libre* [The free woman]: "Liberty, equality—that is to say, a free and equal chance to develop our faculties: this is the victory we must win, and we can succeed only if we unite in a single group. Let us no longer form two camps—that of the women of the people and that of privileged women. Let our common interest unite us. To this end, let all jealousy among us

disappear."² From the early nineteenth century to our own time, female solidarity has been an aspiration posited in recognition of the oppression of women as a group by men as a group; such solidarity was never and is not today a given. What is at stake in the debate between postmodernists and feminists is whether this aspiration to female solidarity should continue to provide a foundation for political action.

Contemporary American feminist theory and practice offers evidence of a growing breach between elite (or intellectual) and popular culture, in this instance represented by speculative academics who are more comfortable with complexities and movement activists and members of the general public who are not. The hierarchical preference given to theory may threaten communication—and effective cooperation—with grass-roots organizers. This collection reflects that schism. A sharp disjuncture exists between the recognizably feminist voice of Gloria Watkins (Bell Hooks), who seems to speak in the tradition of concrete action and the valuation of women *qua* women in extant communities, and the postmodern theoretical proposals of John Dupré and Jane Collier and Sylvia Yanagisako, who in effect are proposing to reduce the sociocultural effect of physiological differences between the sexes to one set of factors no more or no less important than many others and to posit, in a fashion now called postmodernist, a sociopsychological fragmentation of identities. But are these individuals ultimately committed to the same project?

Just as historians are attempting to bridge the gap to the public through women's history, to arouse interest in the historical project of women's emancipation in order to achieve advances in our own time, theorists with postmodern tendencies seem determined to broaden that gap. Is the emancipation of women as a group relative to men as a group no longer a central concern in our time? What should be the social significance of differences in what some call "biology" when they mean reproductive physiology? Should reproductive physiology make a sociocultural difference? Are the values associated with childbearing and nurture imposed only from outside, as some would argue, or do they arise from women's experience throughout history of their own bodily existence? Have reproduction and the requirements of maternity ceased to provide unifying ground? Is the availability of reliable birth control measures and the declining need in industrial societies for constant reproduction responsible for a changing perspective on women's potential for solidarity? Or does sheer bodily similarity and the social construction of its meaning continue to override efforts at deconsolidation? Has the historical conflict for women between the family and freedom been resolved? Can one have it "both ways," as Alison Jaggar and Regenia Gagnier hope? From the historical viewpoint, and despite clever arguments to the contrary, there is reason to doubt it.

Feminism is a political project, and political projects continue to entail choices from which there may be no retreat. Are you with us or against us? Are you ally, enemy, fellow traveler, fifth column? Intellectuals and theorists have historically resisted making hard political choices in the name of higher, seemingly more complete, more complex wisdom. In the process, they have often condemned themselves to political impotence. That is why, in revolutionary times, intellectuals and theorists—those whose thinking is in advance of the common horde's—have always been among the first to be brought before the firing squad. What I am asking here is for us to consider, from a historical perspective, whether the radical new postmodern politics (postmodern feminism, as some call it) suggested by many of the theorists in this volume and elsewhere is really visionary or simply evasive. Can this politics be qualified as "postmodern feminism" or is it rather "postfeminist postmodernism"? How useful to the emancipation and advancement of women is the postmodern critique, particularly its deconstruction of the category "women"? Will it help us to eradicate the subordination of women as a group by men as a group? Or is it a threat to the feminist project? What meaning should feminists attribute to the category women?

In fact, according to the three broad criteria I have sketched out elsewhere for recognizing feminists, postmodern thinking about women fails all the tests.³ The fragmentation of identities it proposes, specifically the dissolution of the category women, threatens the historical feminist project; its effect is neatly encapsulated in the English limerick about the centipede and the toad:

The Centipede was happy quite,
Until the Toad in fun
Said, "Pray which leg goes after which?"
And worked her mind to such a pitch,
She lay distracted in the ditch
Considering how to run.⁴

Without the category women, the feminist project founders. The category women is essential in relation to the equally essential category men. This dualism persists in our sexed bodies and in our cultural constructions of their meaning.

Dualism is much criticized by postmodern theorists. Yet, a striking feature in the history of human thought is the persistence of dualism—of the male/female dichotomy, sameness/difference, subject/object, yin/yang, right/left, up/down, abstract/concrete, and so forth. Even those who seek to transcend dualism often fall back on dualistic terms, as when John Dupré juxtaposes "essentialism" and "antiessentialism." As others have

pointed out, such dualism is deeply enmeshed in Western languages, and hence in our thinking. Nowhere is this more so than in the popular mind. The domestic/public dichotomy has come down to us from Roman law; nature/culture was a staple of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought; the privileging of reason over feeling (and the identification of these terms with male and female) dates from seventeenth-century post-Reformation efforts to reconstruct the European mental universe.

Study of history, in particular the history of women and of feminism, has much to offer contemporary theoreticians. In many interdisciplinary collections, including this one, history has (as I have said) most often been honored in the breach, for historical data and interpretation have the untidy effect of muddying the crystalline waters of theory. One gets little sense when reading contemporary postmodern theory on difference of the place of such theory in the historical "long view"—that is, not over the last twenty to thirty years, but over centuries of human development.⁵ To make only one point, neither the history of women nor the history of feminism, nor yet thought about sexual difference, began in 1859–60 with the contributions of Darwin and Marx. To suggest that they did ludicrously oversimplifies the past.

A historical perspective on such matters first entails cross-cultural comparisons. These would draw their data not primarily from the simpler, far less populous societies documented in the anthropological profession's Human Area Resources files, but from complex, populous, highly organized societies. Such comparisons would reveal both the distinctively Anglo-American tenor of the discussions of difference that characterize so much contemporary theory in the United States and the incipient imperialism of such models. What is revealed is an atomistic focus on the liberation of the human individual—a sort of Hobbesian or Leibnizian monad devoid of distinguishing characteristics. While pointing to the complexity of human identity and inferring its fragmentation, such a perspective reveals itself as existing apart from any notion of community, state, or national sociopolitical goals. This approach to autonomy and the "reconstruction of individualism" could hardly occur in most other Western countries, much less in the rest of the world, where even today sociopolitical goals (such as struggles over territory, the creation of new nation-states, and the restructuring of old ones) continue to override the struggle for individual identity by women and by men. Our emphasis is not the "traditional" one some have suggested, but very exceptional. What some take to be our "cultural assumptions" are the result of once radical assertions that were deployed as weapons in a unique, successful attack on hierarchical religious and political authority in a society where men have systematically subordinated women since at least the thirteenth century.⁶

The history of feminist theory and practice can illuminate these claims. Briefly put, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (in the wake of the Protestant Reformation and Catholic Counterreformation), European sociopolitical critics elaborated their criticism of theological explanations of the natural and social world by articulating what became known as the scientific approach. They invoked physiological, materialistic explanations of social phenomena to displace the claims of religious authority. The social construction of the human and animal body became a metaphor for the body politic as well. The materiality of the human body and sexual differences were called upon to explain and in particular to rejustify basic social arrangements.⁷ Here, not with Darwin, we must look for, locate, and contextually examine the so-called biological arguments for sexual difference, as well as early anthropological studies, which emerged and continue to function in many instances as exercises in cultural criticism. The rise of biodeterministic thinking about the sexes is situated here, and it must be contested here. Darwin's use of such arguments merely confirms an earlier development.

What we can call a tradition of feminist contestation of male domination also launches itself in this early modern period, even before a word existed to epitomize it. The roots of this critique are distinctively Western European but by no means wholly English, as is often claimed.⁸ The importance of the French contribution—informed by the radical skepticism of the philosopher René Descartes, with its mind/body dualism—requires underscoring. What is of particular interest is that throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, French feminists, like the surrounding French high culture in which these ideas were elaborated, not only accepted but insisted on physiological dualism between the sexes and on female experience as mothers as grounds for the project of emancipating women, even demanding a redistribution of political and social power on their behalf. In France notions of complementarity of the sexes and "equality in difference" were fully elaborated. These influenced feminist thinking throughout the rest of Europe and in European colonies and dependencies.⁹

As Carl Degler correctly suggests, notions of biological or physiological difference were widely used in the United States to argue for women's emancipation: what bears underscoring is that our experience was by no means unique. In twentieth-century Europe, such arguments led to extensive protective labor legislation for women, to state-funded maternity leaves with job security for employed women, and to nationally funded family allowance programs. These programs, though by no means always constructed to women's specifications, did benefit many women in the short run.¹⁰ Such programs were explicitly rejected in the United States.

What requires explanation is American *resistance* to such projects on women's behalf amid the many European initiatives that underlay the development of the twentieth-century welfare state.¹¹

Historically speaking, two intertwined strands can be identified in European (and also in American) feminist thinking.¹² The first of these, which I have called *relational feminism*, emphasizes the family, the couple, or the mother/child dyad as the basic social unit of the nation. Physiological differences between the sexes thus become the linchpins for a visionary construction of equitable social differences. The requirements of community, not the needs of the individual, dictated the sociopolitical program, and what some call *womanliness* and others *femininity* was asserted as an enduring and worthy social characteristic. The emphasis was placed on female-defined values. The second strand, individualist feminism, privileges the individual, virtually without reference to the community or group. Physiological differences and hence sociopolitical differences are muted, and equality of individuals and their claim to certain "rights" or entitlements, based on an eighteenth-century model devised for male heads of households (not single men), is uncompromisingly asserted. Within individualist feminism womanly qualities or attributes are necessarily downplayed.

Until very recent times, relational feminism has remained the historically dominant strand in the Western world. Individualist feminism, identified by Europeans (especially since the late nineteenth century) as distinctively Anglo-American, has been a minority phenomenon. Prior to the midnineteenth century it was restricted to notions of moral and intellectual development for women; only recently have material conditions of immense prosperity in North America and Great Britain allowed it to flourish and dominate public discourse. Even Mary Wollstonecraft, who is often thought of as championing an archindividualist concept of women's rights, insisted that "the being who discharges the duties of its station is independent; and speaking of women at large, their first duty is to themselves as rational creatures, and the next in point of importance, as citizens, is that which includes so many, of a mother." To read this statement in the context of her work is to discover that her notion of a rational creature did not override the sex-role related duties expected by society.¹³

As late twentieth-century feminist scholars, we take a great deal for granted. It is important to remind ourselves that the questions we ask today and the goals we now set for women could not be asked or set, had not many of the earlier goals of feminism been achieved. For one, educational goals—women's admission to literacy, to formal education from the primary level to the university, have largely been realized in the Western world (though by no means in other parts of the world). The religious and secular marriage laws that long oppressed married women as a legal class,

relieving them of authority over their own persons and property without distinction of social class, race, or ethnicity have been radically reformed in most Western countries. Secular divorce laws have been enacted, most recently in Italy and Spain, over the bitter opposition of the Catholic church. Women now vote in many of the world's countries and enjoy civil, political, and even economic rights that only a hundred years ago were but dreams and aspirations. Such laws are not always as progressive as some feminists would like, but the institutionalizing of rights in law marks a giant step forward. Enforcement is another matter.

More excruciating problems, notably questions concerning professional and economic opportunities for women that free them from dependence on men and from poverty, questions of sexual violence and prostitution, and reproductive control, remain on the agenda. Political and educational emancipation for women is still an issue in many parts of the non-Western world. It would be foolish to claim that feminists even in the Western world have achieved all goals for women's emancipation. The problems that remain are difficult, deeply rooted, and without question woman-specific.

In response to those who suggest that "postmodern feminism" is a project for individual human emancipation that would neutralize or render irrelevant the question of gender predicated on sexual difference, or that questions of race, class, ethnicity (and perhaps also creed) should have equal weight, let me invoke the counterchallenge posed by the Swedish feminist activist Ellen Key. In 1904, during an era of European nationalism, rampant materialism, a major socialist challenge to capitalism, and state concern with the politics of motherhood, Key prophetically wrote: "We are here face to face with the profoundest movement of the time, woman's desire of freedom as a human being and as a personality, and in this we are confronted with the greatest tragic conflict the world's history has hitherto witnessed. . . . The struggle that woman is now carrying on is far more far-reaching than any other; and if no diversion occurs, it will finally surpass in fanaticism any war of religion or race."¹⁴ I submit that Key's prophecy retains its relevance in our time, and that we are not yet at the point where the feminist project can cede terrain to a postfeminist postmodernism or decree its own dissolution. To think otherwise is badly to misread the past—the history of feminist struggle—and to compromise prospects for a feminist future in which the subordination of women will have become a thing of the past.

The challenge to feminist theory today is not to downplay, minimize, or counterbalance the importance of sexual difference relative to other and also significant and unhealthy cultural manifestations of difference (whether race, class, religion, or other), but to rethink the strategies for female solidarity, now that reproduction and motherhood no longer offer all women a common framework, and to envision ways of restoring and

maintaining for the long term a balance of power in society between the sexes. This can be accomplished only by confronting and challenging the conditions that perpetuate and threaten constantly to reinvent male dominance and female subjection. My prediction is that physiological sexual difference will always dictate a differential cultural construction of gender until such time as the reproduction of the species within a given culture ceases to be an issue. We are not there yet. Even if my prediction is wrong, however, the useful question for our society is not "what if" gender didn't matter, but "how to" construct gender in such a way that the opportunities and choices available to individual women and men are maximized while the goals of the society's future, including reproduction and parenting, are satisfactorily met. Study of the historical record reveals that difference, especially sexual difference, has often led to hierarchy, dominance, and grave inequalities, but it does not show that such differences must necessarily have that result. Rethinking and reclaiming sexual difference—and the category women—in a way that avoids the construction of domination/subordination hierarchies remains a viable theoretical and political project for our time.

15. See Mary E. Hawkesworth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth," *SIGNS* 14 (1989): 553-555, arguing that feminists must not privilege any single model of inquiry but should rather be reflective about levels of analysis, forms of explanation, standards of evidence, criteria of evaluation, and strategies of argumentation. See also Elizabeth Gross, "What Is Feminist Theory?" in Pateman and Gross, ed., *Feminist Challenges*, 192, 194-204.
16. Regenia Gagnier, "Feminist Postmodernism: The End of Feminism or the Ends of Theory?" *infra*.
17. See Frye, "The Possibility of Feminist Theory." See also Elizabeth Spelman, *Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought* (Boston: Beacon, 1988), 114, 167, for a critique of the "ampersand problem in feminist thought," the tendency to add race and class to gender analysis as if there existed some "genetic woman."
18. Bell Hooks, "Feminism: A Transformational Politic," *infra*.

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1. For further discussion of these points, see my essays, "Liberty, Equality, and Justice for Women: The Theory and Practice of Feminism in Nineteenth-Century Europe," in Renate Bridenthal, Claudia Koonz, and Susan Stuard, eds., *Becoming Visible: Women in European History*, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 335-73; and "Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach," *SIGNS* 14 (Autumn 1988): 119-57.
2. "Appel aux femmes," *La Femme libre*, no. 1 (1832). English translation in Susan Groag Bell and Karen Offen, eds., *Women, the Family, and Freedom: The Debate in Documents, 1750-1950*, 2 vols. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), 1:146.
3. Briefly put, these criteria (which are delineated in the context of a historically sensitive definition of feminism) are three: (1) recognizing the validity of women's own interpretations of their experience and needs and acknowledging the values they claim; (2) exhibiting consciousness of, discomfort at, or even anger over institutionalized injustice toward women as a group by men as a group; and (3) advocating the elimination of that injustice by challenging the coercive power, force, or authority that upholds male prerogatives in a particular culture. For additional discussion, see Offen, "Defining Feminism," esp. 150-53.
4. Limerick by Mrs. Edmund Craster (d. 1874), in *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, 2d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), 166.
5. For the long view of European women's history, complemented by substantial bibliographies, see the essays in Bridenthal, Koonz, and Stuard, eds., *Becoming Visible*, and Bonnie S. Anderson and Judith P. Zinsser, *A History of Their Own: Women in Europe from Prehistory to the Present*, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1988).
6. In English society, the doctrine of *coverture* of women in marriage dates from the thirteenth century and eroded only slowly over the centuries. Married women's property acts in Anglo-American society are a nineteenth-century reform. The French case evolved in the opposite direction, culminating in the virtual dispossession of married women in the Civil Code of 1804. The evolution of gender distinctions in property law was critical to determinations of women's subordinate status, insofar as landed property was long deemed an essential precondition for the exercise of political privileges in European societies.
7. For a particularly interesting manifestation of this general development, see Lotida S. Schiebinger, "Skeletons in the Closet: The First Illustrations of the Female Skeleton in Nineteenth-Century Anatomy," *Representations* 14 (1986): 42-82. See also Paul Hoffmann, *La Femme dans la pensée des lumières* (Paris: Editions Orphys, 1978), and Yvonne Knibiehler and Catherine Fouquet, *La Femme et les médecins* (Paris:

- Hachette, 1983). For an account of the British case that does begin with Darwin, see Janet Sayers, *Biological Politics: Feminist and Antifeminist Perspectives* (London: Tavistock, 1982).
8. See, for example, Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979); Hilda L. Smith, *Reason's Disciples: Seventeenth-Century English Feminists* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982); and Christine Fauré, *La Démocratie sans les femmes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985).
 9. See Offen, "Theory and Practice of Feminism."
 10. See Jane Lewis, *The Politics of Motherhood: Child and Maternal Welfare in England, 1900–1939* (London: Croom Helm, 1980); the various essays in Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossmann, and Marion Kaplan, eds., *When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany* (New York: Monthly Review, 1984); and Karen Offen, "Women and the Politics of Motherhood in France, 1920–1940," Working Paper no. 87/293 (Florence: European University Institute, 1987).
- The historical reexamination of the welfare state from a feminist perspective is in progress at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy, and at the Center for European Studies/Women's History Program at Harvard University. For the latter, see the photocopied proceedings, "Gender and the Origins of the Welfare State: Conferences at the Center for European Studies, 1987–88." For an illuminating comparison of the British and French cases, see Jane Jensen, "Both Friend and Foe: Women and State Welfare," in Bridenthal, Koonz, and Stuard, eds., *Becoming Visible*, 535–56.
11. On this subject, see the forthcoming proceedings from the March 1988 conference Women and the Progressive Era, National Museum of American History, Washington, D.C.
 12. Further analysis of these two modes of argument and their consequences can be found in Offen, "Defining Feminism."
 13. Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792); quoted in Bell and Offen, eds., *Women, the Family, and Freedom* 1:61.
 14. From Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage* (1911; originally published in Swedish, 1904), quoted in Bell and Offen, eds., *Women, the Family, and Freedom* 2:25.

REGENIA GAGNIER: FEMINIST POSTMODERNISM: THE END OF FEMINISM OR THE ENDS OF THEORY?

1. Anne Fausto-Sterling, *Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men* (New York: Basic, 1985), 14.
2. For major discussions of postmodernism in social theory, see Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," *New German Critique* 22 (Winter 1981): 3–14; Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," *New Left Review* 146 (July/August 1984): 53–92; Mike Davis, "Urban Renaissance and the Spirit of Postmodernism," *New Left Review* 151 (May/June 1985): 106–12; Terry Eagleton, "Capitalism, Modernism, and Postmodernism," *New Left Review* 152 (July/August, 1985): 60–73.
3. See, for example, Donna Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s," *Socialist Review* 80 (March/April 1985): 65–107.
4. Marian Lowe and Ruth Hubbard, eds., *Woman's Nature: Rationalizations of Inequality* (New York: Pergamon, 1983), 2.

5. Alice Jardine, *Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 36.
 6. Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 18.
 7. Audre Lorde, *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches* (New York: Crossing, 1984), 114.
 8. The response to CLS has been voluminous. For the great collections see *Stanford Law Review*, vol. 36, nos. 1 and 2 (January 1984), *Harvard Law Review*, Special Volume on CLS (Harvard Law Review Association, 1986); and David Kairys, *The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique* (New York: Pantheon, 1982). See also Mark Kelman, *A Guide to CLS* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) and Roberto Mangabeira Unger's books *Knowledge and Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1976), *Passion: An Essay on Personality* (New York: Free Press, 1984), *The Critical Legal Studies Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), and *Politics: A Work in Constitutive Social Theory*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
- For thoughtful critiques of CLS not in the collections, see especially Ward Harper, "Review Essay: The Critical Legal Studies Movement," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Law* (November 1987): 3–12; Drucilla Cornell, "Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 133/2 (January 1985): 291–380, and "The Poststructuralist Challenge to the Ideal of Community," *Cardozo Law Review* 8/5 (April 1987): 989–1022; and James Boyle, "Modernist Social Theory: Roberto Unger's *Passion*," *Harvard Law Review* 96/4 (February 1983): 1066–83.
9. Robin West, "Jurisprudence and Gender," *University of Chicago Law Review*, 55/1 (Winter 1988): 1–72, and "The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory," *Wisconsin Women's Law Journal* 3 (1987): 81–145.
 10. For a full exposition of a cultural-studies approach to subjectivity and value, see Regenia Gagnier, *Subjectivities: The Pragmatics of Self-Representation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
 11. For an emphasis on experiment over theory, see Ian Hacking, *Representing and Intervening* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For a brief discussion of evolution and theory, see John Dupré, "Materialism, Physicalism, and Scientism," *Philosophical Topics* 15/1 (Spring 1988): 39–41.
 12. For the figure of the cyborg, see Haraway, "Manifesto." Roughly, Haraway intends cyborg to represent the collapse of the distinction between the organic and the mechanical.
 13. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985), 174.
 14. Haraway, "Manifesto," 79.

CARL N. DEGLER: DARWINIANS CONFRONT GENDER; OR, THERE IS MORE TO IT THAN HISTORY

1. Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), 867, 873.
2. Lester F. Ward, *Pure Sociology* (New York, Macmillan, 1903), 296.
3. *Ibid.*, 376.
4. *Ibid.*, 326. Ward makes clear his indebtedness to Darwin, saying that the naturalist "makes an unanswerable case in favor of his principle of sexual selection" (327).
5. *Ibid.*, 336.
6. Eliza Burt Gamble, *The Evolution of Woman: An Inquiry into the Dogma of Her Inferiority to Man* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1894), 31, 44, and 61.